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A B S T R A C T
Most member states of the European Union (EU) have some
difficulty in transposing EU directives. Despite the obligation
to comply with EU law, member states are often slow to
adopt national policies implementing directives. In this
paper I analyse this problem by focusing on the coordina-
tion of transposition in the domestic policy arena. Coordina-
tion is approached as a game in which one or more
higher-level players decide on policy when lower-level
players are unable to make a decision. Based on the model
developed in the paper, lower-level players sometimes
appear to have discretion in shaping the policy transposing
a directive. Furthermore, if a single player coordinates the
transposition process, the implementing policy differs from
the policy specified by the directive. However, a decision-
making process with more than one higher-level player can
result in deadlock, leading to a literal transposition of a direc-
tive. Moreover, deadlock between the deciding players may
delay the transposition process. Both mechanisms are illus-
trated by two cases of decision-making on EU directives in
The Netherlands: the cocoa and chocolate products directive
and the laying hens directive. The analysis shows that the
framework developed in this paper contributes to the under-
standing of transposition.
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Introduction
When the European Union (EU) adopts a new directive, this directive needs
to be transposed into national law before it can be implemented. Without
proper transposition, a directive is not integrated into the national legal
system, creating the risk that the policy specified is partly or incorrectly imple-
mented. Despite their obligation to comply with EC law, most EU member
states appear to have some difficulty in transposing directives.1 Even though
the Stockholm European Council (2001) stressed the importance of full trans-
position and agreed that all member states have to reduce their transposition
backlogs to less than 1.5% of the total number of directives in 2002, most
member states, including the largest ones, have not yet met this target.2
Furthermore, using a sample of directives to be transposed by The Nether-
lands, Mastenbroek (2003: 384) found that transposition was delayed for 42%
of the directives, with an average delay of about one year (in one case, the
delay was more than six years after the agreed deadline). More recent work
indicates that delays in transposition seem to be widespread among the
member states (Berglund et al., 2005; Kaeding, 2005; König et al., 2005).
Why do member states sometimes have difficulty in adopting EU policy
that has already been agreed on? This paper answers this question by focusing
on the issue of transposition in relation to national policy coordination. A
number of studies have tried to explain why member states differ in their
transposition success. A recent large-scale study by Falkner et al. (2004, 2005)
identifies ‘different worlds of compliance’ rooted in the cultural and political
characteristics of the member states as the main cause of delays in transpo-
sition. Another approach was developed by Siedentopf and Ziller (1988), and
later by Pappas (1995), which stresses the importance of administrative
capacity and national coordination for compliance. Other authors have
argued that problems with transposition are the result of a ‘misfit’ between
the directive and the existing policy (Héritier, 1995; Duina, 1997; Börzel, 2000)
or domestic administrative institutions (Knill, 1998; Knill and Lenschow,
1998). This ‘misfit’ requires adaptation in the domestic area, which leads to
delay or misapplication of community law. A more actor-oriented perspec-
tive develops arguments about the role of domestic opposition in the imple-
mentation of the directive, and especially different views among the decisive
domestic actors about the preferred regulatory regime. This opposition may
arise from different visions that domestic actors have on how to reform their
domestic policy (Héritier et al., 2001) or different preferences by veto players
(Haverland, 1999, 2000; Dimitrova and Steunenberg, 2000). Delays, according
to this line of argument, reflect the domestic opposition to the implementa-
tion of the directive. Furthermore, differences in domestic interests may lead
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to ‘legislative’ or ‘bureaucratic’ drift, since lower-level policy actors may
deviate from the policy specified in the directive.
In this paper I follow this line of research and use an actor-oriented
approach to transposition. An important question that arises is who the
relevant domestic players are. The answer to this question depends on the
national legal system and the extent to which this system gives policy-making
power to different political and administrative actors, either through consti-
tutional provisions or through existing legislative delegation. Consequently,
decision-making on transposition is not uniformly organized in all member
states and for all directives but consists of processes at different levels in
which various actors play a role. This diversity is illustrated by some recent
findings on transposition. In Spain, for example, for only 11% of the direc-
tives currently in force, the government passed a law through the national
parliament in order to comply with the directive’s requirements (Steunenberg
and Voermans, 2005: 132). More than 80% of the directives were transposed
through either government decrees (40%) or ministerial orders (42%). For The
Netherlands, similar proportions are reported by Bovens and Yesilkagit
(2005). Finally, in Austria, the federal government transposed 41% of EU
directives through federal law and 59% through government decrees in the
period 1995–2003 (Jenny and Müller, 2005). Although this percentage is lower
than in The Netherlands and Spain, again most of the directives were trans-
posed through lower-level legal instruments. Often, the relevant players are
not actors within the member state’s legislative process but administrative
players who implement directives through lower-level legal instruments.
These relevant players have their own views on how an EU directive
should be implemented. Given their different preferences, it is the policy
coordination mechanism that will determine the impact domestic players
have on transposition (see also Kassim et al., 2000). Therefore, I focus on
coordination, which is modelled as a game with two distinct levels: at one
level, players have to propose how to transpose a directive; at another and
hierarchically higher level, players decide when lower-level players have
failed to agree. In this way, decision-making is conceptualized as a multi-level
process in which the higher-level players resolve potential conflict between
the lower-level players. The framework used in this paper builds on
Dimitrova and Steunenberg (2000), who model transposition as a decision by
the government taking account of the preferences of (at least) two domestic
political groups. However, here the assumption that transposition is the
outcome of legislative decision-making is dropped. Transposition is modelled
as a two-level game in which lower-level players try to transpose a directive
first before higher-level players make a move. A related study by Franchino
(2005) models the decision to delegate policy-making to the member states at
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the EU level. Even though he also includes an executive stage in EU policy-
making, the approach taken here differs from this study in several important
aspects. Whereas Franchino assumes that national administrations have the
same preferences as national governments, I include the possibility of differ-
ent preferences between these groups of actors. Furthermore, his model seeks
to determine the discretion offered by a directive, whereas this paper aims to
understand the domestic response to a directive.
The paper is structured as follows. I first develop an analytical frame-
work to analyse national decision-making and the way in which coordina-
tion helps to resolve disagreement among the various players. The analytical
framework is then applied to two cases of decision-making on EU directives
in The Netherlands, which confront the basic logic of the approach with
empirical data. The focus on The Netherlands is useful because this country,
like several other EU member states, has cases of transposition with multiple
coordinating players as well as cases in which only one (administrative)
player coordinates transposition. However, based on the policy-specific
approach taken in this paper, any context could be used to explain transpo-
sition as long as the key factors are identified.
The use of case studies is particularly helpful in this context owing to the
fact that the derived hypotheses require detailed information such as the
identification of players, the main political issue at stake, the preferences of
players, the contents of the policy specified in the directive and the range of
legally feasible policy options (for a further discussion see Pahre, 2005). The
cases selected cover both single-player (cocoa and chocolate products direc-
tive) and multi-player coordination (laying hens directive). The relevant
players in each case, together with their preferences, were established in inter-
views in which the experts were asked to identify the main issues, the players
involved and the positions of these players.3 Official publications, including
the proceedings of the Dutch parliament, have been used in order to validate
the judgements of the interviewed officials. In concluding this paper, I discuss
how national policy coordination contributes to our understanding of trans-
position in the broader discussion of compliance in the EU literature.
Transposition as a problem of domestic coordination:
Towards a model
Transposition is by no means a mechanical process. A directive is the starting
point for drafting a national implementing measure, but it usually requires
additional interpretation. The extent to which this is necessary depends on
the contents of the directive. A directive may provide for certain different
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options or leave open how specific targets have to be achieved. In addition,
it may contain ambiguous provisions resulting from intergovernmental
bargaining at the EU level. Franchino (2004: 286–91) studied the various
degrees of specificity of directives and found that directives sometimes
provide member states with substantial discretion, especially when imple-
mentation requires specialized and technical knowledge.
This discretion allows member states to choose from a range of policies
that could be implemented domestically. Following Dimitrova and Steunen-
berg (2000: 216), these policies are called sustainable policies. However, if a
domestic policy outside the range of sustainable policies is selected, the
Commission will challenge the member state for not transposing or for incor-
rectly transposing a directive into national law.4
Depending on the national legal system, directives are transposed in
different ways, including statutory law, government decrees and ministerial
orders (for an overview, see Asser Instituut 2004: 24–5; Steunenberg and
Voermans, 2005). Naturally, a statutory law or act needs to be approved by
parliament. Sometimes parliament adopts a general authorization law that
allows the government to transpose all directives (for example, the European
Communities Act in the UK) or a list of directives (for instance, the lois
d’habilitation in France). In this context, often a ‘call back’ procedure is used
in which parliament has to approve the adopted measure, by either explicit
or implicit approval. Other member states, such as Denmark, Germany and
The Netherlands, employ specific delegation clauses, which give non-
parliamentary actors the authority to adopt implementing measures in some
policy area. These measures, which include government decrees and
ministerial orders, are typically prepared by administrative actors within
national ministries or implementing agencies. Parliamentary acts regulating
the delegation to these actors are often general or cover a large part of a policy
area (Steunenberg and Voermans, 2005: 43–5). They provide administrative
actors with substantial power, sometimes including the possibility to trans-
pose any directive in a field, long before a directive is passed. Therefore, at
the stage of transposition, governments have limited choice over the
procedure to be applied.
The variations in decision-making procedure indicate that different
players can be involved in transposition processes. In this paper, I therefore
use the notion of policy-specific players who formally or informally have the
authority to affect the outcome of decision-making: they may have the right
to draft a proposal (agenda-setting power), or they may need to support a
proposal individually or collectively (veto power) (Tsebelis, 1995; Steunen-
berg, 1996: 314–16). Players are not restricted to ‘formal’ players in the
national legislative process (Tsebelis, 2002: 19) but include those with 
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informal power as well. This notion of players relates to the concept of ‘factual
veto points’, as developed by Héritier (2001: 12), which refers to players with
de facto decision-making power.
Emphasizing the importance of coordination – by either political or
administrative players – I approach transposition as a process taking place at
two distinct levels, each with different players: lower-level and higher-level
(or coordinating) players. The lower-level players try to decide on a measure
transposing a directive. These players could be civil servants in the minist-
erial units preparing a ministerial order or ministers drafting a statutory law.
The higher-level players become involved when the lower-level players have
not been able to reach agreement on how to transpose a directive or on certain
issues of it. Depending on the procedure used, these players can be different
ministries overseeing the transposition process, different administrative
bodies involved in the transposition process, cabinet ministers who share
responsibility for the policy area involved, or different coalition parties in
parliament that need to support the adoption of transposing legislation.
Looking at the two-level structure in the decision-making process, the
question arises of why higher-level players do not make decisions themselves
and avoid delegation. However, deviations from the most preferred policy do
not necessarily imply that higher-level players prefer to make these decisions
themselves (Horn, 1995; Epstein and O’Halloran, 1999). First, higher-level
players delegate decision-making because they do not have the time, capacity
and expertise to make policies on a large number of different issues. Refusing
to delegate and holding on to their power inevitably leads to ineffective
policies with outcomes that are politically harmful or to no policy at all.
Clearly, avoiding such outcomes provides the motivation for higher-level
players to involve lower-level players in the policy process. Second, in the
context of statutory law, delegation is best understood as providing the
administration with policy-making power for a broad range of issues. It under-
scores that higher-level players are not very interested in each and every detail
of a policy and prefer to make a ‘go’ or ‘no-go’ decision with regard to the
final proposal. Without going any deeper into the reasons for delegation, I will
discuss now how existing coordination mechanisms affect transposition.
All players are assumed to have single-peaked, spatial preferences over
outcomes in terms of domestic policy. These preferences imply that each
player prefers a specific and unique policy. The position equating to this
policy is called a player’s ideal point. Moreover, the further away an alterna-
tive policy is from this ideal point, the less it is preferred. The ideal point is
labelled Li for a lower-level player, i ∈ {1, 2, . . ., n} and Hi for a higher-level
player, i ∈ {1, 2, . . ., m}. Furthermore, I assume that at each level one of the
players (the agenda-setter) has the authority to put a proposal to the other
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players, who decide whether to accept or to reject the proposal. The need to
reach an agreement on the implementing instrument is represented in terms
of veto power for each of the participating players: only if both actors accept
the proposal, and thus refrain from using their veto power, is a policy
adopted.
The game is structured as follows. The lower-level player with agenda-
setting power proposes an implementing measure to the other lower-level
players. These players decide whether to accept or to reject the proposal. If
all lower-level players accept the proposal, a policy is adopted. Given such
agreement, the higher-level players need only to approve the policy. However,
if the lower-level players do not agree, the higher-level agenda-setter puts a
proposal to the other higher-level players, who then decide whether to accept
or to reject the proposal. Finally, the European Commission decides whether
to challenge the implementing measure by starting an infringement
procedure. I assume that the domestic players prefer to avoid being chal-
lenged by the Commission since they would lose face domestically as well as
internationally.
The various stages of the game are illustrated in Figure 1. Following this
sequence of play, and assuming that players have complete and perfect infor-
mation, the concept of sub-game perfectness can be used to identify the equi-
librium, which depends on the set of sustainable policies and the specific
players’ preferences.
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Figure 1 Domestic transposition: The sequence of moves.
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The power of the higher-level player
How will the domestic players transpose the directive? If lower-level players
have to decide on an implementing policy, the first issue is whether sustain-
able policies exist, that is, policies that will be permitted by the Commission.
As illustrated in Figure 2, all points between d and d¯ are sustainable policies
(and form the set of sustainable policies D), which include the policy speci-
fied by directive d. Furthermore, sustainable policies are not necessarily
symmetrically distributed around d. The directive may suggest a minimum
level of regulation (as in the case of the laying hens directive), or the wording
in the directive may be interpreted in only one way. Consequently, the
distances between d and its minimum and maximum values may vary.
The second issue is whether both lower-level players prefer some alterna-
tive to the point of reference, that is, the policy proposed by the higher-level
players. I start with a model with only one higher-level player and relax this
assumption later. If the higher-level player is not constrained in making a
choice, as in Figure 2(a), this player will set the policy equivalent to his or
her ideal position as the implementing policy, that is p = H1. This policy is
part of the set of sustainable policies and will not be challenged by the
European Commission. Furthermore, this policy is the higher-level player’s
best choice from the set of policies this player prefers to the directive d. This
set, which I will call the higher-level player’s set of preferred policies, includes
all policies between directive d and the player’s point of indifference h1(d).
The higher-level player’s choice for the implementing policy of p = H1
renders it difficult for the lower-level players to select an alternative.5 Lower-
level players are able to make a proposal only if policies exist that are jointly
preferred to the higher-level player’s preferred policy. This is the case if the
individual preference sets of the lower-level players overlap. For the config-
uration in Figure 2(a), those sets do not overlap since p is found between both
players. Whereas player 1 wants a change to the left of p, player 2 prefers a
change to the right. This configuration makes lower-level decision-making
impossible.
A similar problem arises for the configuration presented in Figure 2(b), in
which all players prefer a policy that is substantially different from the direc-
tive. Being constrained by the set of sustainable policies, the higher-level
player’s best choice is policy p = d¯, which is both a sustainable and a preferred
policy. Furthermore, the lower-level players prefer some alternatives to p.
These alternatives are found in the lower-level players’ set of preferred propos-
als, which are equal to the interval between p and 1(p) in Figure 2(b). Since
veto player 1 wants a smaller deviation from policy p than veto player 2 does,
player 1’s individual preference set is more restrictive and thus determines the
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elements of this set. Although preferred proposals exist, these policies do not
overlap with the set of sustainable policies. Consequently, no policies exist that
are both sustainable and preferred by the lower-level players. Again, lower-
level decision-making is impossible and the higher-level player decides.
The analysis indicates that the higher-level player decides the implement-
ing policy if the lower-level players are divided over this policy (condition 1)
or if they cannot draft a preferred proposal that is also a sustainable policy
(condition 2). The higher-level player also decides the implementing policy if
the directive equals his or her ideal point (condition 3). In these instances, the
lower-level players do not affect the implementing policy. Using these
conditions, the following expectation can be formulated with regard to the
power of the higher-level player: under each of three conditions mentioned, the
higher-level player selects an implementing policy closest to his or her most preferred
position (Hypothesis 1). Although I have used only one player, a similar result
holds for cases with more than one higher-level player. In that case, condition
3 has to be substituted by the necessary condition that the directive should not
divide the higher-level players (see Propositions 1 and 1A in the Appendix).
If these conditions are not present, other outcomes occur. These are
discussed in the following section.
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Figure 2 The power of the coordinator.
Discretion to lower-level players
Although coordination may lead to a policy implemented by the higher-level
player, this outcome is not common. If policies exist that are sustainable,
preferred by the higher-level player and preferred by all lower-level players, the lower-
level players will transpose a directive. These policies are called feasible policies
because they satisfy each of these three conditions. In the preference configu-
ration presented in Figure 3, feasible policies are found between d and H1.
If feasible policies are available to the lower-level players, the question
is which policy will be made. For the moment, I assume that player 1 is the
agenda-setter, and player 2 has the possibility of rejecting the proposal.
Making his or her best choice, player 1 chooses interpretation d, which is
accepted by player 2, approved by the coordinator and not challenged by the
Commission. This outcome is a literal interpretation of the directive. A differ-
ent outcome is found if player 2 and not player 1 is the agenda-setter: this
player would propose interpretation L2. The directive is now transposed in a
non-literal way through a domestic policy equal to player 2’s most preferred
position.
Generally, lower-level players often adopt the policy that transposes a
directive. This occurs if the lower-level players prefer an implementing policy
that differs from the one preferred by the higher-level player (negation of
condition 1) and can draft a preferred proposal that is also sustainable
(negation of condition 2), while the directive does not equal the higher-
player’s most preferred position (negation of condition 3). Using these new,
necessary conditions, I define decision-making situations in which the lower-
level players have discretion. The degree of discretion depends on the size of
the set of feasible policies. With regard to the outcome, as indicated by Propo-
sition 2 in the Appendix, the following expectation can be formulated: under
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Figure 3 Lower-level discretion.
the three conditions mentioned, the lower-level players transpose a directive and adopt
an implementing policy closest to the most preferred position of the lower-level
agenda-setter (Hypothesis 2).
Multi-player coordination
Another mechanism is multi-player coordination, which has more than one
higher-level player. Here, I will use an example with two higher-level players,
H1 and H2. The Appendix presents a result for every possible number of
players. Since multi-player coordination is the more general case of single-
player coordination, it includes results similar to Hypotheses 1 and 2, which
I will not discuss further (see the Appendix for details). However, multi-
player coordination also allows a third outcome, which was not possible
under single-player coordination. This possibility is based on preference
configurations such as the one presented in Figure 4.
In Figure 4 the higher-level players are divided over the issue of how to
transpose the directive. Whereas player 1 prefers a change to the left, player
2 wants a change to the right. Although sustainable policies exist, the
domestic players disagree on transposition and are unable to make a decision
to deviate from d. This creates a situation of deadlock in which the higher-
level players initially are unable to decide on a domestic policy and eventu-
ally agree on a literal transposition of d (see Proposition 1B in the Appendix).
This result, which is typical for multi-player coordination, leads to the
expectation that if higher-level players are divided on a directive, the directive is
transposed in a literal way (Hypothesis 3). It specifies a proposition by
Dimitrova and Steunenberg (2000: 215–16, 222), who suggest that any division
between players leads to a literal transposition. However, the model proposed
in this paper indicates that this outcome is typical for multi-player coordina-
tion: it mainly occurs if higher-level players have to make a decision and are
divided. A difference in views between the lower-level players does not
necessarily lead to this outcome since a decision is made by the higher-level
players in this case.
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Figure 4 Deadlock.
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Literal transposition as a result of deadlock can be associated with delay
in the transposition process. Because the higher-level players prefer changes
in opposite directions, they may hinder swift decision-making. Some players
may postpone their decision to the very last moment, whereas others may try
to resolve the existing deadlock by redefining the issues at stake, adding new
issues, linking the issues with other decision-making processes, or trying to
change the preferences of the opponents (Héritier, 1999: 16–17). In the end,
and if these attempts are not successful (which would otherwise change the
decision-making situation), opposing preferences lead to a literal transposi-
tion. This process suggests an additional expectation: if higher-level players are
divided, transposition is delayed (Hypothesis 4).
Having discussed the main features of both coordination mechanisms, I
now turn to two empirical cases of transposition in which these mechanisms
play a role. Although in both cases domestic players were divided on how to
transpose certain aspects of the directive, the processes and outcomes of trans-
position were rather different.
Cocoa and chocolate products directive
The first case concerns a directive on cocoa and chocolate products adopted
by the Council and the European Parliament on 23 June 2000 (European Parlia-
ment and Council, 2000). The goal of this directive is to create common rules
for the composition, specification, packaging and labelling of cocoa and choco-
late products. One of the main issues was whether chocolate may contain other
natural vegetable fats (Bailer and Schneider, 2006). The use of vegetable fat was
heavily contested because the chocolate industry in the member states followed
different traditions. Producers in the UK and Ireland had been using vegetable
fats other than cocoa in the production of chocolate. Chocolate producers in
Belgium, France, Luxembourg and The Netherlands did not use these in-
gredients. Fearing competition from the larger manufacturers in the UK, these
countries opposed the use of fats other than cocoa. After years of preparation,
the European Commission released its proposal to change the ingredients of
chocolate in April 1996 (European Commission, 1996). Despite the opposition
of The Netherlands, which voted against the common position in the Internal
Market Council of 28 October 1999, the directive was adopted one year later.
Since August 2003, chocolate in the EU may contain natural vegetable fats up
to an amount of 5% of its total weight. Furthermore, the sales names of choco-
late were harmonized and strictly regulated by the new directive.
The chocolate directive was transposed in The Netherlands using two
government decrees, as illustrated in Figure 5. Both decrees were based on
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Figure 5 Transposition of the cocoa and chocolate products directive in the Netherlands.
the existing Commodities Law, which provides the Minister of Health,
Welfare and Sport with the authority to propose decrees on food safety, which
have to be approved by the cabinet. In making a decree, the minister, who is
an independent agent within the Dutch context, has the lead and is politi-
cally responsible for the adoption of the proposal. The minister is therefore
de facto the deciding player. Transposition was completed in June 2002 with
the adoption of the second decree. Despite strong opposition in the prepara-
tory process, the transposition process was finalized more than a year before
the deadline.
The relevant players were the ministries involved in the procedure of
changing the decrees based on the Commodities Law. The Ministry of Health,
Welfare and Sport had the lead, and consulted the Ministry of Agriculture,
Nature and Food Quality and the Ministry of Economic Affairs.6 The Direc-
torate on Food and Health Protection of the Ministry of Health prepared the
decree and can therefore be regarded as the lower-level agenda-setter. The
Ministries of Agriculture and Economic Affairs are the other lower-level
players. Being politically responsible for the making of the decree, the
Minister of Health is the only higher-level player. This setting makes the trans-
position of the cocoa and chocolate products directive an example of single-
player coordination as presented earlier.
The relevant domestic players did not take a strong stand on the use of
other vegetable fats and were more interested in how strict the rules would
be on the sales names, definitions and characteristics of chocolate products.
The Ministry of Health was concerned about food safety and whether the
packaging of chocolate products would provide sufficient information about
ingredients to consumers. Economic Affairs and Agriculture aimed at estab-
lishing a level playing field for chocolate products in the Union. Economic
Affairs in particular had a strong preference for having uniform rules regard-
ing chocolate products. This meant that both Economic Affairs and Health
preferred clear and unambiguous rules on the sales names, definitions and
ingredients of chocolate products. The Ministry of Agriculture, however, held
a less pronounced view on this since it was concerned with the position of
the industry, which was divided over the directive. The positions of the
domestic players in the transposition process are illustrated in Figure 6.
The directive explicitly prohibited additional national regulations that
could hinder the free circulation of chocolate products under the sales names
mentioned in the directive. Article 4 of the directive states that, for these
chocolate products, ‘Member States shall not adopt national provisions not
provided for by this Directive’. This prohibition, as well as the exact wording
used in the text, limits the possibilities for member states to reinterpret some
of the directive’s provisions. Consequently, the set of sustainable policies is
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narrowly defined. This set is indicated by the grey area in Figure 6, where d
represents the contents of the directive.
Because the lower-level players – the departments within the Ministries
of Economic Affairs, Agriculture and Health – were divided over the imple-
menting policy, the configuration presented in Figure 6 corresponds to the
situation described by Hypothesis 1. This hypothesis predicts that the lower-
level players would accept the policy proposed by the higher-level player,
which is the Minister of Health. The Minister’s best policy choice, p = d¯,
which is located at the upper boundary of the set of sustainable policies, is
the expected outcome. This theoretical outcome, which slightly deviates from
the literal content of the directive, is confirmed by the empirical outcome. The
government decree actually deviated from the original text of the directive
on some issues concerning sales names and labelling of chocolate.
During the transposition process the Ministry of Health noted that some
product descriptions in the directive were not mutually exclusive, which
would allow some products to be labelled in two different ways. This applied
to, for example, the definitions of milk chocolate and family milk chocolate in the
annex of the directive, which used overlapping percentages of cocoa solids.
The ministry differentiated between these two products by also defining the
maximum amount of dry cocoa solids in family milk chocolate (see Article
13 of the government decree on cocoa and chocolate). In addition, the ministry
observed that Article 3 of the directive did not clearly indicate how to deter-
mine the percentage of total dry cocoa solids to be presented on the label of
chocolate products. After consulting the Commission, and in accordance with
an opinion of the Standing Committee on Foodstuffs, the percentage was
interpreted as the amount of cocoa solids in the chocolate content of a finished
product (Minister of Health, 2001: 10).
These adaptations in the implementing measure indicate that the trans-
position of the directive was not carried out in a literal way but took some 
of the concerns of the higher-level player into account. This observation is in
line with the framework developed in this paper. In addition, the transposi-
tion of this directive was not delayed and was finished more than a year
before the actual deadline. It shows that strong opposition against the direc-
tive during the legislative process, which was fuelled by the Ministry of
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Figure 6 Preferences of the domestic players on the cocoa and chocolate products
directive.
Foreign Affairs, did not preclude the Ministry of Health from transposing the
directive on time. The issues that played a role during transposition differed
from the ones that played a role during the EU legislative process. Once the
decision was taken to allow vegetable fats in chocolate other than cocoa, the
Ministry of Foreign Affairs lost interest and did not participate in the domestic
decision-making process, and the interventions by other players focused on
sales names and the labelling of chocolate products.
Laying hens directive
The second case discussed here is a directive on the protection of laying hens,
which was adopted by the Council on 19 July 1999 (Council of the European
Union, 1999). The goal of this directive was to provide minimum standards
for the keeping of laying hens, especially with regard to the use of cage
systems. The directive introduced new and higher minimum standards for
cage systems, including more space, a separate space or ‘nest’, perches, and
litter to allow for pecking and scratching. Systems satisfying these standards
are called ‘enriched’ battery cages. The directive also set higher requirements
in terms of space in existing battery cages. Moreover, the so-called ‘unen-
riched’ battery cage systems could no longer be brought into service after
1 January 2003 and will be prohibited from 1 January 2012 onwards.
The Minister of Agriculture, Nature Management and Fisheries, Laurens
Jan Brinkhorst (D66), aimed to transpose the directive by government decree
(see Figure 7). The existing Health and Welfare Law for Animals provides the
minister with the conditional authority to decide on the issues related to the
welfare of animals, including how they are kept. A proposed measure has to
be presented to parliament and, if parliament does not respond within one
month, the measure comes into force. This call-back procedure differs from
the procedure used for transposing the cocoa and chocolate products direc-
tive, in which the Minister of Health had unconditional decision-making
authority.
In the case at hand, parliament responded by indicating that it preferred
the rules transposing the directive to be introduced by law. Owing to the
unexpected fall of the second Kok cabinet in April 2002, this dossier was taken
over by the new State Secretary of Agriculture, Nature Management and Fish-
eries, Berend Jan Odink, who was a member of the List Pim Fortuyn (LPF)
in the first Balkenende cabinet. Disagreement within the LPF led to the fall
of that government in October 2002 and new elections in January 2003.
Although the State Secretary at first preferred to amend the initial decree on
the keeping of laying hens (Minister of Agriculture, 2002), he decided to
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Figure 7 Transposition of the laying hens directive in the Netherlands.
withdraw his predecessor’s proposal and make a new decree, which was
adopted in May 2003 (see Figure 7). Again, parliament used its authority to
require that the government introduces these rules by law. The Minister of
Agriculture, Nature and Food Quality in the second Balkenende cabinet, Piet
Veerman (CDA), who served in the same post in the previous cabinet,
discussed the proposal with parliament. The law adopting the second decree
on the keeping of laying hens was eventually approved by parliament on 31
March 2004. It came into force on 19 May 2004, more than two years after the
deadline.
The relevant players were, first of all, two departments within the
Ministry of Agriculture: the Department of Legal Affairs, which was respon-
sible for transposing the directive, and the Policy Department, which
prepared the Dutch position during the preparation of the directive and was
involved in the negotiations at the EU level (the Department of Animal
Production and Welfare in the Directorate of Agriculture of the Ministry). The
Minister of Agriculture can be regarded as the agenda-setting player among
the lower-level players. The higher-level players were primarily the political
parties supporting the government. Based on the three cabinets that dealt
with the laying hens directive, these parties included the Labour party
(PvdA), the Liberals (VVD) and D66 in the second Kok cabinet, the Christian
Democrats (CDA), the LPF and the Liberals in the first Balkenende cabinet,
and the Christian Democrats, the Liberals and D66 in the second Balkenende
cabinet. The involvement of these higher-level players makes the transposi-
tion of the laying hens directive an example of multi-player coordination as
distinguished in the theoretical model.
The domestic players were divided regarding the level of protection of
laying hens. On the one hand, the departments within the Ministry of Agri-
culture as well as Minister Brinkhorst agreed to ban battery cage systems. In
the coalition agreement of August 1998, the government already announced
that it preferred to ban battery cages, most preferably in the context of the
EU. However, if agreement at the EU level were not feasible, the cabinet was
prepared to take unilateral measures to ban these systems in The Netherlands
(Dutch Parliament, 1998: 59). Based on the possibilities offered by the direc-
tive, the departmental actors as well as the minister thus preferred a high
level of protection by banning all battery cage systems, including ‘enriched’
cages as mentioned in the directive. This position was supported by the
Labour Party and D66. The Greens and the Socialist Party, which were part
of the opposition, also preferred a ban.
On the other hand, the Liberal Party did not support a ban of ‘enriched’
battery cage systems. According to this party’s position, the minister had not
transposed the directive correctly. Furthermore, by setting higher standards
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than demanded by the directive, the proposed rules would damage the laying
hens sector by increasing competition from farmers in other European
countries (Dutch Parliament, 2002: 3). This position was also supported by
the Christian Democrats, the LPF and the SGP (the Reformed Protestant Party,
one of the smaller Christian parties). The responsible cabinet members – State
Secretary Odink (LPF) and Minister Veerman (CDA), respectively – favoured
a literal transposition of the directive without setting higher standards. In
their view, the laying hens sector had to decide whether it wanted to keep
‘enriched’ battery cages or use alternative free-range systems. The preferences
of the main actors are illustrated in Figure 8.
With regard to the alternative systems, the directive laid down only
minimum conditions in terms of housing, food, water and care of hens,
frequently using words such as ‘at least’ in describing these conditions. Provid-
ing a minimum level of protection, the set of sustainable policies is thus asym-
metric, as indicated by the grey area in Figure 8: although lower standards are
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Figure 8 Preferences of the domestic players on the laying hens directive.
Notes: SGP (Reformed Protestant Party) and CU (Christian Union) are both small Christian parties.
Because the directive defines a minimum level of protection, the contents of the directive d are in
this case equivalent to d. A maximum sustainable policy, d–, is left open.
not allowed, member states can introduce higher levels of protection. The
cocoa and chocolate products directive, in contrast, provided a strict regulatory
framework from which member states were not allowed to deviate.
A set of sustainable proposals allowing the introduction of higher stan-
dards and the opposing preferences of the governing parties in the second
Kok and the second Balkenende cabinets correspond to the situation
described by Hypothesis 3.7 Since the directive is still located in the interval
between the ideal positions of these higher-level players (although at the
lower bound), they are expected to adopt a literal interpretation. In addition,
because the players are in a situation of deadlock, the transposition process
is expected to be delayed (Hypothesis 4).
The prediction of Hypothesis 3 – literal transposition – is supported by
the empirical outcome because parliament accepted the new decree, which
includes the option of ‘enriched’ battery cages. With the support of the LPF,
Minister Veerman passed the bill to implement the decree through parlia-
ment. In a crucial vote on an amendment to ban ‘enriched’ cage batteries, the
Christian Democrats, the Liberals and the LPF voted against, whereas the
amendment was supported by D66 and the Labour Party.
Furthermore, as predicted by Hypothesis 4, transposition was substan-
tially delayed in this case: The Netherlands did not transpose the directive
until more than two years after the deadline. This delay was mainly shaped
by the divide between the Christian Democrats, the LPF and the Liberals on
the one hand and the Labour Party and D66 on the other. This twice led to
an initiative to discuss the decree on laying hens in parliament: the Liberals
and the Christian Democrats, together with the SGP, required the first decree
to be discussed in parliament; the Labour Party wanted parliament to
consider the second decree. Two initiatives on the same issue are unusual and
substantially delayed the transposition process. In addition, preparing a
government decree takes time owing to administrative consultations, includ-
ing the obligatory advice of the State Council. That the State Secretary as well
as the Minister in the Balkenende cabinet decided to introduce a new decree
further slowed down the process. In this respect, the elections and the subse-
quent government reshuffle hardly affected delay. If all relevant players had
preferred the first decree, the directive would have been transposed in
November 2001, thus meeting the deadline.
Conclusions
The goal of this paper is to show how domestic actors interact to shape trans-
position. A first finding is that single-player coordination is better capable of
adapting a directive to domestic preferences than is multi-player coordination.
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Multi-player coordination is defined as a mechanism in which two or
more higher-level players decide on how a directive will be handled. Differ-
ences in view between these higher-level players lead to political deadlock,
that is, a situation in which opposing interests do not permit any other
decision than a literal transposition of the directive (see also Dimitrova and
Steunenberg, 2000: 214–18). This situation is illustrated by the cumbersome
transposition of the laying hens directive, which took almost five years to be
implemented, thus delaying implementation for more than two years past the
official deadline.
Single-player coordination does not suffer from the drawback of deadlock
and provides more opportunities for a non-literal transposition, which allows
domestic players to adapt the directive to their preferences. The dynamics of
single-player coordination are illustrated by the cocoa and chocolate products
directive. The Minister of Health had the lead in this process, which was
concluded in less than two years and more than one year ahead of the official
deadline. There was no delay despite the fact that some domestic actors in
The Netherlands – and especially the Ministry of Foreign Affairs – were very
much against this directive. Furthermore, the directive was transposed in a
non-literal way, satisfying a stricter level of regulation, which was preferred
by the higher-level player.
Both coordination mechanisms allow lower-level players to draft an
implementing policy, which provides these players with discretion. The
analysis shows that the degree of discretion available to the lower-level players
is a result of the existence of sustainable policies that will be approved by the
higher-level players. Moreover, it also depends on whether all lower-level
players prefer certain policies. If sustainable policies are limited, or one of the
higher-level players prefers a policy close to the one specified in the directive,
lower-level players’ leeway will be limited. This indicates that the degree of
discretion lower-level players have is not equal to the degree of discretion
provided by the directive (that is, the range of sustainable policies). Lower-
level discretion is thus further shaped by national coordination mechanisms.
The empirical analysis in this paper also illustrates that, depending on
the case, different domestic actors need to be regarded as relevant players.
In this paper an actor is considered as a player if he or she, formally or infor-
mally, has authority to decide on a policy. Players then have de facto power.
In the case of the laying hens directive, the relevant players included the
Minister of Agriculture, departments within the ministry and the main politi-
cal parties in parliament. This corresponds with some claims that national
political parties – sometimes taken as national legislative veto players – play
an important role in transposition (see, for instance, Treib, 2003; Mbaye, 2001;
Giuliani, 2003). However, most directives do not require the introduction of
a statutory law or parliamentary approval based on the conditional
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delegation of policy-making power. In the case of the chocolate and cocoa
products directive, the required changes could be unconditionally intro-
duced by government decree. In this case, the relevant players are adminis-
trative actors, including some departments from other ministries, and not
national political parties.
The mechanisms of single-player and multi-player coordination are thus
linked to the extent to which the transposition of a directive requires changes
in the existing national legal system. If the contents of a directive require the
adoption of only one or more ‘lower-level’ instruments (such as ministerial
orders or government decrees), transposition could take place within the
framework of single-player coordination. A minister in political systems with
a weak core executive, or the prime minister in other systems, could resolve
potential conflict between lower-level players. Problems of deadlock and
delay may not arise. However, if a directive requires the introduction of new
law, multi-player coordination seems to be inevitable, especially if the govern-
ment is based on a coalition. Consequently, deadlock and delay are possible.
The findings in this paper resemble the approach that understands delay
as the result of ‘misfit’ between EU and domestic policy (Héritier, 1996; Risse
et al., 2001: 6–9). In contrast to this approach, however, the analysis in this
paper suggests that delays resulting from a ‘misfit’ in terms of opposing pref-
erences disappear when players’ preferences change. There are several ways
of producing preference changes and thus resolving the problem of deadlock.
One way is extensive deliberation between these players, which may change
preferences. Another possibility is issue linkage, which increases the possi-
bilities of exchange among domestic actors and could lead to mutually
preferred solutions. At the same time, issue linkage may also complicate
transposition (Falkner et al., 2004: 465–6). A third option is to redefine the
relevant players in the decision-making process, which could, for instance, be
done by moving a dossier to another group of actors (for example by involv-
ing an advisory committee). The last possibility is to postpone discussion until
some major political changes take place, such as new elections.
In a more general way, the paper shows that European policy-making, to
the extent that it concerns directives, does not end at the last stage of the
legislative process in the Council of Ministers. After adoption, directives are
further shaped by the member states when they are put into national rules.
In this process, and within the limits of Commission oversight, domestic
actors can adopt an interpretation that somewhat deviates from the directive.
In this way, EU policy-making is best described as a long chain of mutually
dependent decisions that cuts across multiple levels of government. Despite
this complexity, the current literature on the EU tends to emphasize the EU
legislative stage in which policy is shaped by the interactions between the
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Council of Ministers and the European Parliament. However, from a policy
perspective, such a view is insufficient and does not show how the ambitions
formulated in Brussels are transformed and implemented in the national and
sometimes regional and local administrations of the member states. The
approach proposed in this paper can help to disentangle and clarify these
complex processes and their outcomes.
Notes
I thank the interviewed government officials for their willingness to participate
in the research project on which this paper is based. An earlier version of this
paper was presented as a Jean Monnet Lecture at the Free University of Berlin
and at the 33rd Joint Sessions of ECPR, 14–19 April 2005, in Granada, Spain. I
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1 The obligation to comply is found in Articles 10 and 249 EC. Based on EU
case law, directives take precedence over national law, they are binding as to
the result to be achieved in the member states, and they take direct effect if
the provisions are unconditional and sufficiently precise (Kapteyn and
Verloren van Themaat, 1998: 326–31, 535–7). Moreover, national governments
are, in some circumstances, liable for the damage to private parties resulting
from late or improper transposition of directives (Kapteyn and Verloren van
Themaat, 1998: 564–9).
2 See the various Commission scoreboards on internal market directives at
http://europa.eu.int/comm/internal_market/score/index_en.htm, which
includes the internal market directives in force, or the overview by the
Secretariat General of the European Commission at http://europa.eu.int/
comm/secretariat_general/sgb/droit_com/index_en.htm#transpositions,
which contains all directives including those that are no longer in force. Based
on the latter source, the average backlog was 2.3% on 10 January 2005, and
20 of the 25 member states did not comply with the Stockholm target.
3 In this way, it is possible to specify the key factors that, according to Ganghof
(2003), are the main issues in empirical veto player studies. See Bueno de
Mesquita and Stokman (1994), Stokman and Thomson (2004), Selck and
Steunenberg (2004), Thomson et al. (2006) for other empirical studies using
expert opinions in handling these issues.
4 The Commission uses various instruments to challenge member states and
impose compliance. On the one hand, the Commission can start an infringe-
ment procedure and bring a case to the European Court of Justice. The
Commission needs to defend its claim that a member state deviated from EU
law, and a member state may challenge the Commission’s judgement. On the
other hand, the Commission often uses ‘soft’ enforcement mechanisms such
as inspections, reviews and auditing protocols. In combination with ‘naming
and shaming’, these mechanisms can be rather effective in limiting the range
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of policy alternatives to member states. See Börzel (2003) for a further
discussion of the Commission’s compliance strategies.
5 See the Appendix for the special case of a single lower-level player. The
Appendix is not included in the printed version of this paper and can be
found on the EUP website at http://www.uni-konstanz.de/eup/issues.htm
or at http://steunenberg.bestuurskundeleiden.nl.
6 Interestingly, the Directorate-General for International Cooperation of the
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, which is responsible for development aid, played
a prominent role in shaping the Dutch position in the Union’s legislative
process. The ministry strongly opposed the idea of allowing other vegetable
fats than cocoa in the production of chocolate to protect cocoa farmers in
developing countries. However, when it came to transposition, this ministry
was no longer interested in the directive and, according to several govern-
ment officials, did not play a role in discussions.
7 I disregard the decision-making under the first Balkenende cabinet because
this cabinet’s period of government was too short to decide on the laying
hens directive.
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